Jari Ehrnrooth, 19 June 2018

Purpose of hope and society of well-doing

25 May 2018, Tallinn Estonia

Ladies and gentlemen, dear fellow EU-citizens,

I am pleased and honoured that I was invited to bring some of my ideas and arguments considering the meaning structure of western culture and concept of freedom to this high level political panel. Speaking of freedom could not find a more distinguished and appropriate forum than here in Estonia, in your centennial year.

In Europe, every political agent speaks about values – about human rights, about fair trade, about social security and justice, about equality of all human beings, about stopping the climate change, about right of well-being to every one. So far so good, one could say, and yet I have the feeling that all in this proud and loud European value-talk is not rattling right.

Something is missing. And that something is the great common vision or the promising bright future or the ultimate goal of our much-valued culture and society of freedom. I cannot help but think that European people do not know to which end they really want to lead the historical process. And yet the process goes on, it cannot be stopped – so it would be once again time to consider the very basic ideas of human nature and goals of human development.

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Florian Hartleb, 5 March 2018

Revolution. The rise of right-wing populism in Germany

The year 2016 was an annus horribilis and acted as a warning about the new reality of post-truth politics. It included Brexit, the refugee crisis, the fear of Islamist terrorism with numerous and ongoing attacks, the rise of right-wing populist parties and, more generally, authoritarian developments on a global scale. After the dramatic accumulation of warning signals for the liberal democracies and the EU as a political system sui generis, two scenarios have been discussed: was 2016 the zenith of the wave of populism with the Dutch and French elections serving as a reality check (Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders could not reach the unrealistic goal of becoming president and prime minister of their respective countries) or is it just the start for populism as a central political force in European politics?
Matthew Crandall, 23.01.2018,

The changing world order and President Trump: year one in review


The 2016 United States presidential election elevated a temperamental populist to the presidency during a volatile time in world politics. The United States had not seen a president like Trump since perhaps Andrew Jackson (1829-1837). As a presidential candidate, Trump destroyed common norms for a prospective president with blustering tweets and inappropriate speech. The world hadn’t seen such turmoil since the breakup of the Soviet Union: a nuclear North Korea, resurgent Russia, lingering conflicts in Africa, war in the Middle East and the accompanying great wave of migration. Critics of Trump warned of doomsday scenarios and the need for calm, steady leadership in a time of turmoil. The world is still in turmoil and Trump continues to tweet whatever comes to his mind, but none of the doomsday scenarios have come to pass. With one year already having gone by, it is a good time to evaluate President Trump’s presidency and its impact on the world order and transatlantic relations in particular.
Vlad Alex Vernygora, 14.09.2017,

NATO and its partnerships in the Asia-Pacific vs. China’s “marching West”: a new international system in the making? *


Global multi-polar redesign has already become an ordinary attribute of the actuality – a good number of serious scholars consider it independent variable in their research on international relations. The framework that was established by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in February 1945 is increasingly looking like an atavism of the ancient past. The San Francisco Conference, which had almost precisely followed the geostrategic ‘recipe’ prescribed by the three ‘healers’ at Yalta, wanted the world to believe that it was up to 51 countries to establish the United Nations (UN). Definitely, it was not up to them, but an excellent myth was created. From then on, every single General Debate of the UN General Assembly has been featured by dozens of statements delivered by different political leaders on how proud their respective nations are to be known in history as inaugural members of the mighty UN. In such situations, there is always a temptation to ask a regular Ukraine, for example, a set of simple questions: “Hey, Ukraine! Did the fact that you were admitted to the UN on 24 October 1945 help you to stop the most recent Russian aggression? Why did the “other peace-loving states”, which, according to the UN’s main document, “accept[ed] the obligations contained in the […] Charter and, in the judgment of the Organisation, […] [were supposed to be] able and willing to carry out these obligations”1, do very little to prevent the appalling tragedy of Ilovaisk in August 2014? How could it happen that one of the major “peace-loving states” is the actual aggressor? Please do not answer, these were rhetorical enquiries.”